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Abstract
We propose a network implementation with enhanced security at the
physical layer by means of time-hopping CDMA, supporting cryptograph-
ically secure point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communication. In
particular, we analyze an active star topology optical network implemen-
tation capable of supporting 128 simultaneous users up to 20 km apart.
The feasibility of the proposed scheme is demonstrated through numeri-
cal simulation. keywords: optical fiber communication, access networks,
secure communication, CDMA
1 Introduction
Communication methods employed today in access optical networks are inher-
ently insecure, as they do not provide privacy from a sufficiently motivated
eavesdropper, as signals are broadcasted to all users, e.g., as in Passive Op-
tical Networks (PONs). Communication security must be implemented by the
end-points on higher-level protocols, and is often neglected.
This paper proposes an access network architecture where security is pro-
vided by a time-hopping CDMA scheme at the physical layer. The proposed
scheme provides point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communication, allow-
ing the setup of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) among users. In this way, each
client transmits in frame slots assigned by a cryptographically secure PRBS.
Since each user transmits one bit per slot, collisions occur and are handled by a
combination of Bloom filters [2] and standard error-correction algorithms opti-
mized for Z channels [6]. Bloom filtering is a technique borrowed from hashing
algorithms where a bit is transmitted in K slots into the same frame; therefore
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it is sufficient to receive a single ‘0’ out of K copies in order to correctly retrieve
the original transmitted ‘0’ whereas, in a Z channel, collisions have no effect on
‘1s’.
An early approach to this idea was presented in [14], where a combination of
wavelength hopping and direct sequence CDMA with orthogonal codes was used
to provide security in the link, whereas our proposal uses a single wavelength
and time hopping CDMA. More recently, Refs. [9] and [10] proposed a VPN
built with direct sequence CDMA using Walsh orthogonal coding on a single
wavelength channel. Although orthogonal codes make an efficient use of the
available bandwidth, in Ref. [12] it is shown that the security they provide
is weak due to the reduced code space. Finally, Ref. [15] used the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt data, and then sent this encoded stream
by direct sequence CDMA with a short code length, that is, security is provided
in a higher layer, i.e., as is standard cryptography [12]. In contrast, our proposed
scheme uses a key to feed each PRBS giving non-orthogonal coding sequences,
thus producing a larger search space in case an attack is attempted. Moreover
we use a non-linear generator, e.g., a self-shrinking generator [7].
The architecture proposed in this paper consists of a star network topology
using a single wavelength, in contrast to other optical access network designs
[3]. The proposed topology and functionality resemble that of a PON (users can
be regarded as Optical Network Units, ONUs) but note that point-to-point as
well as point-to-multipoint communication are supported. To receive an specific
channel, the user/ONU needs the corresponding key, thus it can communicate
as many users as keys it has. A privileged user can communicate all other users
acting as the Optical Line Termination (OLT) in PONs.
2 Architecture
The proposed system is composed of an access layer, where CDMA and error
correction are implemented, and a physical layer based on an optical network
with certain similarities to PONs. The access layer is implemented using time-
hopping CDMA, where each of the 128 possible ONUs sends bits in a slot
randomly chosen from a frame of 356 slots; therefore collisions between differ-
ent ONUs will occur and error correction must be used to guarantee error-free
transmission. Notice that the synchronization is performed at the bit slot level
only because transmission of each ONU is random, in contrast to TDMA where
synchronization is also performed at the frame level. Moreover, each ONU can
send data at any time, in contrast to TDMA where ONUs usually send data
continuously; this feature resembles transport by Ethernet frames. A certain
ONU X can receive messages from an ONU Y if X has the key of Y , and
viceversa. Therefore, if a certain group of ONUs were to communicate over a
VLAN, it is required that everyone in the group knows each others’ keys. ONUs’
data streams are encoded with the following error correction techniques (Fig.
1): Reed-Solomon (223/255) and LDPC (1024× 512 matrix) algorithms (see [8]
and references therein), and Bloom-filters with K = 4 [2]. The choice of these
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Figure 1: Proposed network design: Access Layer
correction algorithms was heavy influenced by modeling the optical fiber as a
Z-channel, having a Shannon limit of CZ = log2
(
1 + (1− p)pp/(1−p)
)
, where p
is the probability of error. This capacity limit is larger than that of a symmetric
memory-less binary channel [13].
The proposed physical layer topology is that of a star (see Fig. 2) where
optical splitters redistribute traffic coming from each ONU to all the rest allow-
ing point-to-multipoint as well as point-to-point communications between 128
ONUs. An Erbium-Doped Fiber Amplifier (EDFA) located in between splitters
at the optical hub increases optical power to overcome network losses. RZ mod-
ulated optical signals generated at each ONU, of up to 10 Gbps by a 2 dBm
1550 nm DFB-laser, are transmitted up to 10 km upstream by a standard single-
mode optical fiber (ITU-T G.652) to the optical hub.
In this hub a 128× 1 splitter merges traffic from all ONUs that is then re-
distributed by a 1 × 128 splitter channeling back merged traffic to each ONU
through a downstream fiber identical and parallel to the upstream fiber. Split-
ters’ attenuation (≃ 25 dB each) contribute, as well as fiber attenuation and
insertion losses (≃ 2 dB and ≃ 1 dB per stretch), to high total losses (≃ 28 dB
at both upstream and downstream paths). In order to provide signal amplifi-
cation an EDFA (≥ 27 dB gain and noise figure 7 dB) is placed between both
splitters. This EDFA increases merged traffic power at the first splitter output
(≃ −26 dBm ‘1’ active Tx) delivering an adequate power level (1 dBm, ‘1’ ac-
tive Tx) at the second splitter input to provide ONU’s receiver a power level for
proper reception (−27 dBm, ‘1’ active Tx) with a high sensitivity (−28 dBm)
photodetector (PD). The PD maximum optical power is not a concern as our
simulations show that only up to ten ‘1s’ collide at any given bit slot. Even
considering a constant EDFA gain, the PD input optical power would be lower
(−17 dBm) than that commercial PDs withstand unharmed (∼ −5 dBm). The
bit ‘0’ level at PD is given by the addition of the ‘0’ bit transmitted by all
128 ONUs. The receiver decision threshold should be able to separate between
this state and that of a single ONU transmitting a ‘1’ bit. As the bit ‘0’ trans-
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Figure 2: Proposed network design: Optical Layer
mission power should be very low, imposing restrictions on the DFB-laser ex-
tinction ratio. The minimal required extinction ratio (‘1’/‘0’ peak power ratio)
is addressed in the numerical simulations explained next.
3 Numerical simulations
We developed a modular simulator platform both for ECC and optical channel
stages. It was released under the GNU license [11].
The physical optical channel simulation block provides an estimate of the
BER performance of the optical channel. Simulation steps are as follows: RZ
upstream traffic coming from all ONUs is assumed to arrive at the 128 × 1
splitter with perfect time synchronization, i.e., there is no timing jitter. The
‘0’-bit slots contain a small CW optical intensity given by the Tx extinction
ratio. Each on-line ONU adds its ‘0’-bit optical intensity yielding a base power
level. Each ‘1’-bit adds a super-Gaussian (m = 4) pulse, duty cycle 1/3, to the
base power level.
Upstream and downstream merged traffic suffers from attenuation due to
splitter, fiber, and splice losses. The power budget is balanced by an EDFA
with 27 dB constant gain. Amplified spontaneous emission from the EDFA is
modeled by white Gaussian noise, with intensity proportional to the amplifier
noise figure (7 dB), and is added after the EDFA.
The input optical signal at the receiver is filtered (2nd order low-pass But-
terworth filter, 25 GHz bandwidth) and photodetected assuming a standard PD
responsivity (see section 4.4.3 of [1]). White Gaussian noise accounting for ther-
mal and shot noise is then added to the photocurrent, and electrical filtering is
applied (2nd order low-pass Butterworth filter, 14 GHz bandwidth).
Noise fluctuations at power levels near the PD sensitivity limit have an im-
portant effect on signal detection. Shot noise is of particular concern as it is
proportional to the mean photocurrent. In our network proposal the later is
4
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Figure 3: Physical (optical) layer simulation result: Minimal extinction ratio
required to assure a given BER.
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Figure 4: Simulation results: Logical channel
higher than in PONs as bit ‘0’ optical intensities from all ONUs are added.
The resulting base-level optical intensity is then heavily dependent on the Tx
extinction ratio. Fig. 3 shows minimal extinction ratios required to achieve
an arbitrary BER in the physical layer as a function of the number of on-line
ONUs. In the 128 ONUs scenario a BER< 10−3 can be achieved using commer-
cially available transmitters with an extinction ratio ≃ 16.6 dB. This BER is
low enough to allow for logical-channel error-correction routines that guarantee
error-free transmission, while still making use of a fair fraction of channel ca-
pacity when non-orthogonal codes are used. Fig. 4 shows simulation results for
the fraction of the total capacity and the BER of one channel at the coding level
(circles) and including physical layer impairments (squares). These results were
obtained by sending one Gigabit of data for each ONU simultaneously. This
figure shows a channel utilization of 15.7% when all of 128 ONUs are transmit-
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ting simultaneously, with a BER< 10−8. From Fig. 2 we observe a penalty of
8 ONUs when impairments from the optical layer (mainly extinction ratio and
noise from EDFA and PDs) are taken into account. Considering that the system
was designed to support asynchronous communications (e.g., Ethernet), it is not
likely that all the ONUs will transmit simultaneously (e.g., Internet links often
operate at most at 90% load); and therefore our system has a BER < 10−8 for
each channel when 119 ONUs are transmitting at a same time (119/128 > 0.9).
Observe that the high error rates correspond to a worst-case scenario when all
ONUs are transmitting simultaneously at full capacity, and also there is a low
penalty due to physical layer impairments.
4 Security Performance
There are four basic goals related to security performance: Confidentiality, in-
tegrity, availability and authenticity [5]. The proposed scheme provides con-
fidentiality and integrity in the downstream channel, leaving availability and
authenticity implementations to higher-level protocols. Confidentiality and in-
tegrity are achieved by using time-hopping CDMA. Attacks on this kind of
systems are extensively studied in [12]. The proposed system is resistant to
brute-force attacks since the code space size can be grater than 2256 (related to
the period of the PRBS), the proposed PRBS is non-linear e.g., a self-shrinking
generator [7] or AES in PRBS mode, and the key of each ONU is never broad-
casted to the network. The key distribution must be performed beforehand
using any secure method available [4]
5 Conclusions
We proposed a time-hopping CDMA network architecture capable of support-
ing both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communication of up to 128
ONUs with a worst-case rate of 12 Mbps. Furthermore, the proposed scheme
provides security at the physical layer and VPNs between ONUs can be set up
without additional higher-level protocols. We also showed that there is a low
penalty due to physical layer impairments, such as transmitter extinction ratio
and attenuation at fibers, splitter, and splices. We believe that our proposal
opens the door to the design of a larger secure CDMA network, covering longer
distances and servicing more end users.
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